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AIRPORT ANTI-HIJACK SEARCHES AFTER SCHNECKLOTH:
A QUESTION OF CONSENT OR COERCION
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,' the Supreme Court undertook
an extensive review of fourth amendment case law to determine precisely
what the prosecution must demonstrate to establish a valid consent to
search. The Court ultimately held that to justify search on the basis of
the subject's consent, the prosecution must show that the consent was vol-
untarily given, but that proof of voluntariness does not require a showing
that the subject knew of his right to refuse.2 This holding has an immedi-
ate impact in the area of airport search cases in which the issue of consent
appears frequently. Earlier airport cases have expansively applied the
"stop and frisk" doctrine of Terry v. Ohio,' and Schneckloth suggests a
further loosening of fourth amendment restraints. This note will first ex-
amine Schneckloth's possible erosive effects on fourth amendment protec-
tions in the context of the airport search. Thereafter, the note will sug-
gest that Schneckloth is inapplicable in the context of an airport search,
because of certain inherently coercive factors that distinguish the airport
search from other search cases.
II. SCHNECKLOTH v. BUSTAMONTE
The defendant Bustamonte was a passenger in an automobile which
had been stopped by police officers because of a faulty headlight. After
requesting the six occupants of the car to step out, the officers asked a pas-
senger, a brother of the car's owner who was not present, for permission
to search the car. The man replied affirmatively and assisted in the search
by opening the trunk. Several stolen checks were found stuffed under the
rear seat, and as a result defendant Bustamonte was charged with posses-
sion of a check with intent to defraud. The checks were admitted as evi-
dence in defendant's trial, and on the basis of them Bustamonte was con-
victed. The conviction was affirmed on appeal to the California District
Court of Appeal, and a writ of habeas corpus sought by the defendant in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
was denied. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the order of the district
court and remanded the case for further hearings on the question whether
the defendant knew at the time of his consent to search that he had the
right to refuse. The Ninth Circuit held that, absent proof by the prosecu-
tion that the defendant had knowledge of his right to refuse, the defen-
1412 U.S. 218 (1973), rev'g 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1971).
2 Id. at 222.
8 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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dant's verbal expression of assent to the search would not have been suffi-
cient to establish valid waiver of the constitutional right to refuse consent;
absent this knowledge the search would be unlawful.4
The Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certiorari to deter-
mine whether the fourth and fourteenth amendments require proof of the
knowledge of alternatives as demanded by the Ninth Circuit. In its deci-
sion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled, over vigorous dissent
from three Justices, 5 that to establish effective consent to search the prose-
cution need not prove that the subject knew of his right to refuse or that
he had been advised of his right to refuse. The Court chose to follow in-
stead the rule in California state courts that advice to a suspect that consent
to search may be refused is not a sine qua non of a voluntary search. Al-
though knowledge of the right is a factor to be considered, "voluntariness"
is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances surround-
ing the search, with careful scrutiny given to possible coercive factors,
either express or implied.' Applying this test to the facts of the Schneck-
loth search, the Court found in the "congenial" atmosphere of that search
no evidence of coercion sufficient to invalidate the search and require sup-
pression of the evidence found therein.
The Court's rejection of the requirement of informed consent and its
express refusal to extend to fourth amendment rights the requirements of
"knowing and intelligent" waiver,7 now well established for effective relin-
quishment of fifth and sixth amendment rights, is of great significance to
fourth amendment law in general." However, the merits of Schneckloth
and its ultimate effect on the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard
are beyond the scope of this note. Inquiry is here confined to the impact
of Schneckloth on airport search law.
Within one month after the Schneckloth decision, at least two courts
reached divergent conclusions when applying Schneckloth in deciding ap-
peals from convictions based on evidence discovered during anti-hijack
4 Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971).
5 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan voiced his doubts and those of his fellow dissenters,
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall: "It wholly escapes me how our citizens can
meaningfully be said to waive something so precious as a constitutional guarantee without
ever being aware of its existence." 412 U.S. at 277.
6Id. at 227.
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8412 U.S. at 241. Here the Supreme Court answered a question long-debated among
the courts: whether the strict standards for waiver of fifth amendment rights required by
AMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), also requires warnings of fourth amendment rights
before consent to search can be effective. State courts have been reluctant to require warnings.
See, e.g., People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 98 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1971); State v.
Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 760-61, 150 N.W. 2d 915, 917-18 (1967). The federal courts have
been more willing to extend requirements of intelligently given consent to consent searches.
See, e.g., Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826
(1966); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Note, Consent Searches:
a Reappraisal after Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 130 (1967).
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searches. In one of these cases, People v. Bleile, a California court of
appeals cited Schneckloth as controlling on the question of consent; where-
as, in the second case, United States v. Ruiz-Estrella,0 the Second Circuit
distinguished the airport situation from the Schneckloth search on the basis
of possible coercion in the airport. It is submitted that from the standpoint
of fourth amendment values the Second Circuit has reached the better
result. However, before evaluating the distinction made in Ruiz-Estella
it is necessary to explore two ways in which Schneckloth, as interpreted
in Bleile, may impinge constitutional safeguards: one, as authority for re-
jecting the rule of United States v. Meulener"l requiring advice to a subject
before search that he has the right to avoid search by declining to board;
and two, as support for relaxing the stringent requirements for meaningful
consent which have developed in airport search law.
III. IMPACT OF SCHNECKLOTH ON PRIOR
AIRPORT SEARCH CASE LAw
Factually, People v. Bleile follows a now familiar pattern. On May 26,
1972, the defendant attempted to board a flight from Los Angeles to San
Francisco at Los Angeles International Airport. As he passed through the
required magnetometer check 12 carrying a luggage bag, a positive reading
alerted a United States marshal who was monitoring the machine. The
marshal then asked the defendant to pass through the magnetometer with-
out the bag. When the defendant did so, the magnetometer registered
normal. The defendant, at the request of the marshal, then opened his
luggage bag, revealing, among other items,'3 a yellow plastic bag contain-
ing marijuana. Marshal Nichols arrested Bleile, who was subsequently
convicted of possession of marijuana. On appeal to the California Court
of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed.
In his appeal, the defendant's sole contention was that the marijuana
had been obtained through an illegal search and seizure, and that the trial
court had therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence.
Defendant objected to the search on several grounds,' 4 but he relied heavily
9 33 Cal. App. 3d 203, 108 Cai. t.p.r. 682 (1973).
10481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
1351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
12The magnetometer is a metal detection device through which passengers are required
to pass and which is calibrated to detect a certain level of metal weight. United States
v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
13 Other items included a safety razor which was apparently the source of the high magne-
tometer reading. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 203, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
14The defendant also argued that the search was impermissibly broad; that the plain
smell of the marijuana was not the same as plain view; that the search should have been
limited to a "pat-down" of the yellow laundry bag; and that the marshal should have walked
with the laundry bag through the magnetometer to determine if it contained metal before
opening it. All of these contentions were rejected. Id.
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on the argument that the marshal had a duty to advise him, before open-
ing the luggage bag, that he had the option either to consent to a search
or leave without boarding the plane. In the absence of such advice, he
argued, the search was impermissible: consent was invalid because he was
unaware of his right to refuse; and the search was unreasonable because
any danger of the defendant's hijacking the plane would have been allevi-
ated by his declining to board. The Bleile court, relying on the Schneck-
loth rule that knowledge of the right to refuse is not a prerequisite to
valid consent to search, rejected the defendant's argument 5 and thereby
rejected the Meulener rule which requires advice that one may avoid a
search by declining to board. Thus the question whether or not the Bleile
court improperly extended Schneckloth in relying on that decision to reject
the Meulener rule is presented.
A. Advice and Consent-Effect of Schneckloth
on the Meulener Right-to-Refuse Rule.
To support his argument that he should have been advised of his right
to avoid the search by declining to board, Bleile relied on a recent federal
judicial rule in United States v. Meulene, 16 requiring such advice. In
Meulener, the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence
of narcotics discovered during an anti-hijack search because he had not
been given the opportunity to avoid the search by not boarding. When
presented with this rule, the Bleile court rejected it as an outgrowth of the
Ninth Circuit position-that consent to search is not voluntary unless it is
proved that the defendant knew he had the right to refuse-which was
overruled in Schneckloth. However, because the Meulener rule speaks not
only to consent searches, but also to searches justified by the "stop and
frisk" doctrine of Terry, -' it should not be dismissed as a mere outgrowth
of the Ninth Circuit consent rule. Furthermore, it is questionable whether
Schneckloth, which involved only consent searches, should be applied to
that branch of Meulener dealing with the reasonableness of a Terry-type
search. Rather, that aspect of Meulener has independent precedential
roots, and the question is whether these roots can sustain the rule's viabil-
ity beyond Schneckloth.
The limited scope of this note precludes an extensive discussion of
the fourth amendment questions raised by the Terry doctrine in the air-
port searches,' 8 but a short resume is necessary to set the stage for Meul-
15 33 Cal. App. 3d at 207, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
16351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
17 392 U.S. 1 (1968), upholding a "pat down" search for weapons by a police officer
who has reason to believe that the subject is an armed and dangerous individual, regardless
of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual.
18 For general discussion of fourth amendment questions raised by F.A.A. passenger and
luggage search procedures see Note, Airport Sec,4rity Searches & The Fourth Amendment, 71
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ener's role. Briefly, under the fourth amendment's prohibition against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures,"' 9 it is well settled that a search conducted
without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable, and
this rule is subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. These exceptions include a search conducted with the subject's
consent and a search for weapons based on a reasonable fear for the safety
either of the officer conducting the search or of others.20 This latter excep-
tion, commonly referred to as the "stop and frisk" rationale of Terry has
been the governmental justification for many of the airport searches, and
decisions concerning the validity of these searches have turned on the ques-
tion whether there was a reasonable fear that the passenger might be carry-
ing weapons or explosives. A search conducted after the passenger met
the F.A.A. hijacker "profile" 21 and also registered a high reading on the
magnetometer was held constitutionally permissible.22  Later, a frisk justi-
fied by the magnetometer reading alone was upheld 3 Further, a prospec-
tive passenger's nervous behavior, his use of four different names, and a
bulge in his pocket were also found to be sufficient justification for search. 4
And more recently, the Terry doctrine, originally intended primarily for
the protection of the officer, was extended to include protection of bystand-
ers in the airport although the officer had no reasonable fear of danger
to himself.25 In this incremental stretching of Terry a significant problem
is the absence of any limit on the focus of the search. Most of the criminal
evidence discovered relates not to hijacking but to other offenses, princi-
pally narcotics violations.26 Since the general law of search and seizure
COLUM. L REv. 1039 (1971); Note, The Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search or Seizure,
48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1261 (1973); Note, Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs
& Alternatives, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 383 (1973) Note, Airport Freight and Passenger Searches:
Application of Fouth Amendment Standards, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 953 (1973).
19The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . and no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause.... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20 Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), rev'g 488 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1971),
21 The "profile" was developed by a governmental task force which used statistical, sociologi-
cal and psychological data to isolate certain characteristics which set hijackers apart from the
rest of the air traveling public. When a passenger is observed to fit these characteristics,
he is focused upon by the air line. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
22 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d
1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (profile
and magnetometer sufficient to justify search; however, evidence suppressed on appeal because
air li9 6 official had altered criteria of the 'profile").
23United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947
(1972).
24United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995
(1971).
25United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973); see companion casenote, 34 Ohio
- St. LJ. 896 (1973).
26 
"It is passing strange that most of these airport searches find narcotics and not bombs,
which might cause us to pause in our rush toward malleating the Fourth Amendment in
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permits the use of evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution even
though that evidence was not the object of the search,27 airport searches
have been the source of many governmental windfalls.
Cases following Terry have produced no easy formula for determining
when a given situation will meet the required "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from these facts, rea-
sonably warrant the intrusion." The only discernible trend is a tendency
by the courts to dilute the standards needed for justification.29 Indeed, in
an often quoted passage, Judge Friendly said that, given the risk of hijack-
ing, the "danger alone meets the test of reasonableness," and he would
have no difficulty sustaining a search that was based on nothing more than
the trained intuition of an air line ticket agent or a marshal,
Because there is no easy test for reasonableness, courts are faced, on
a case by case basis, with new and bizarre fact situations forcing determina-
tions of reasonableness turning on factual minutiae. For example, a cru-
cial question in a recent case was whether the search of one end of an
envelope with a bulge "approximately one-fourth inch thick and two inches
across" was reasonable in a search for possible explosives.31 The Eighth
Circuit found this search to be impermissible and reversed the conviction
for possession of the amphetamines and one marijuana cigarette found
therein. However, if the bulge had been four inches wide instead of two,
the court might have found the search reasonable and the evidence ad-
missible. Walking this "two inch" wide line between valid and invalid
searches demands almost superhuman judicial surefootedness.
To assure against a misstep, the Meulener rule offers a sensible guide.
Instead of seeking the ejusive key to what is reasonable, Meulener addresses
the question of what is not reasonable, thus clearly delineating at least
one boundary:
While there is a governmental interest justifying a search in the case
of passengers who actually board the plane, there is no such interest with
respect to persons who merely appear at the boarding gate and choose not
order to keep the bombs from exploding." United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 414 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring). In this regard see N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1971, at 1, col.
4, for report from federal officers that of 1500 air traveler arrests in the previous year, 400 were
for narcotics violations, 400 for illegal aliens, and 300 for trying to board with weapons. See
Comment, Constitutional Problems Raised by Anti-Hijacking Systems, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
356 (1972).
27 "But, as always, the self-discovered crime, and that, really, is what airport surveillance
elicits, does not attract immunity because it falls into police hands as an unsought by-product
of privileged activities." United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947); United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d
494, 497 (7th Cir. 1968).
28 392 U.S. at 21.
29 See, generally, Note, Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search or Seizure, 488 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1261 (1973).
30 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972).
81United- States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (lth Cir. 1973).
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to board, and accordingly a physical search of one's person and luggage
is held to be impermissible under these circumstances.82
If it is the threat of hijacking and that threat alone which justifies the
search, removal of the threat obviates the justification. If the passenger
declines to board, he no longer presents a threat; consequently further
search of the non-boarding passenger without warrant, consent, or arrest
would be unlawful.
The Bleile court in rejecting the foregoing contention denied that the
governmental interest is satisfied by permitting the "suspect" to leave the
boarding area rather than submit to search. The court suggested that the
passenger may go to the boarding area of another flight where security
officers might be less vigilant. Further, the passenger "may still represent
an extreme danger to persons and property inside the terminal."'3  The
implications of this reasoning are unmistakable: the exigencies of air
piracy which permit search before boarding would also justify search of
anyone within the terminal.
There is little in the case law to support such a widening of the
zone of danger to include the terminal itself. Even Judge Friendly, for
whom "danger alone" would be proof of reasonableness, insisted that the
passenger should be given advance warning of the search so that he could
avoid it by choosing not to travel by air. Similarly, Judge Mansfield
voiced his concern over any attempt at "punching a hole in the fourth
amendment" in order to protect against air piracy, and suggested that air-
line officials in addition to the screening methods already used could fur-
ther protect themselves by refusing passage to a suspected hijacker.3 4 More-
over, in United States v. Clark,33 Judge Mansfield, in the majority opinion,
cited Meulener as support for his ruling that the search of the defendant's
bag could be justified only upon a showing that the defendant was aware
that he had the right to refuse to be searched if he chose not to board.
The contrast between the Second Circuit's approval and the Bleile
court's rejection of Meulener reflects the current unsettled question of the
viability of the Meulener rule. Its proponents see the rule as a "judicious
procedure"36 to assure a meaningful consent, while its opponents usually
base their disapproval on either the impracticality of warnings in the air-
port search situation or the possibility that such a requirement will impede
the search for hijackers. For example, one critic of the Meulener right-
to-refuse rule foresaw the Bleile court's contention that if the passenger
32351 F. Supp. at 1290.
3 33 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
S4 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1972).
35 475 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1973). Conviction of passenger for possession of cocaine
was reversed on the ground that excluding him from a hearing dealing with the secret F.A.A.
profile was a violation of his sixth amendment right to public trial.-
36 6 IND. L. REV. 828 (1973).
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declined to board he might still be considered sufficiently dangerous to
justify a frisk.3 7  In response to this argument, it is submitted that, al-
though the passenger may still be dangerous, the reasonableness of the
danger once the passenger has refused to board should be measured by
normal Terry standards rather than by the diluted standards which have
evolved for anti-hijack searches. The fourth amendment rights of a pro-
spective passenger who chooses not to board should be co-extensive with
those of anyone else in the air terminal and, for that matter, with those
of anyone on the street.
The most ominous assault on the right-to-refuse rule was expressed
by a California state court in People v. Smith,8 in which the court sug-
gested that a reasonable inference of danger could be drawn from the
passenger's attempt to leave the boarding area after an announcement that
all carry-on luggage would be inspected.1 - - As pointed out by a recent
commentator, this holding raises "grave constitutional questions because
the subject's decision to exercise a constitutional right should not provide
justification for an invasion of that right."4
Further disapproval of the Meulener rule was expressed by the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Skipwith.4 Both the majority, which confirmed
the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine, and the dissent, which
wanted to limit the use of evidence discovered in airport searches to that
which was the object of the search,4' expressly disapproved the rule an-
nounced in Meulener, apparently fearing that it would hamper police activ-
ities by reinforcing the exclusionary rule. The Second Circuit, on the other
hand, in Ruiz-Estrella,43 decided the same week as Skipwith, twice cited
Meulener with approval--once on the issue of valid consent and once on
the issue of whether the danger justified the search.44
Thus, just as the California Court of Appeals differs with the federal
district court, so the Second Circuit disagrees with the Fifth Circuit on
the necessity for advising the prospective passenger that he has the right
to refuse search by declining to board. Since these cases were all decided
after the Schneckloth decision, it is apparent that the decision has not
written so clear an epitaph to Meulener as was read by the Bleile court.
37 Note, Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs, & Alternatives, 40 U. CM. L.
REV. 383, 407 n. 162 (1973).
3829 Cal. App. 3d 106, 105 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1972). Report withdrawn by order of the
California Supreme Court.
891d. at 111.
4 0 Note, Airport Freight and Passenger Searches: Application of Fourth Amendment Stan-
dards, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 953 (1973).
4142 U.S.L.W. 2019 (5th Cir. Jun. 14, 1973).
42 "1 feel that . . . viable use (I am not speaking of mere confiscation) should not be
made of proceeds toward which the search was not, and could not have been independently,
directed." Id.
43481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
441d. at 727, 730.
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Indeed, the Schneckloth definition of consent bears little relevance to the
Meulener rule when Meulener is viewed in the context of search based
on reasonableness. Therefore, since Schneckloth has not settled the issue
of Meulener, the conflict remains to be resolved. 5
B. Effect of Schneckloth on Requirements for "True" Consent Search
in the Airport.
If the search to which the passenger must submit is reasonable because
of the hijacking danger, his "consent" to the search is not the kind of con-
sent involved in a "true' consent search in which there is no alternative
justification for search. Consent in the "true" sense is a relinquishment of
fourth amendment rights and has traditionally been regarded as the weak-
est possible basis for search.4 6  Consequently, when dealing with cases in-
volving the airport context courts have generally been wary of searches
which the government has tried to justify solely on the basis of consent.
In most air search cases in which consent was an issue, the question
arose, as in Bleile, only as an alternative ground for search.47  In these,
the court rejected the consent theory, but upheld the search on grounds
of reasonableness under Terry. In a few instances, the government tried
to justify the search on a theory of implied consent based on the passenger's
4 5 Title II of the Air Transportation Security Act of 1973, currently awaiting consideration
in the House of Representatives, contains a requirement, specifically added to Senate Bill
#39 by the Senate Commerce Committee prior to introduction on February 2, 1973, that
the prospective passenger before being searched must be informed of his right to refuse search
by choosing not to board. In its report, the Senate Commerce Committee, echoing Meulener,
declared that the only purpose for inspection of passengers and luggage is to insure that
dangerous weapons will not be carried aboard the aircraft; therefore refusal of passage satisfies
this purpose as effectively as does the search. The Bill, passed by the Senate on February
2, 1973, prescribes procedures to be followed in passenger inspection and contains the following
provision: "If consent for such a search is denied, such person shall be denied boarding
and shall forfeit his opportunity to be transported in air transportation."
Further, the Committee in its recommendation that appropriate notices be provided at
airports advising passengers of the procedures to be followed and of the passenger's right
to refuse search, noted that such advice "will go a long way in diminishing legal challenges
to the security program and will provide further safeguards to individual liberties and freedoms."
Tide I, Air Transportation Security Act of 1973 would provide the following procedures
for screening passengers and carry-on possessions for unauthorized weapons.
Only passengers who activate positive response from from the weapons detect-
ing device to be subject to search. But before any physical search or frisk of the
individual is conducted he must be given the opportunity to remove from his person
clothing or other belongings any items which might have activated the detection
device. If at this time, the person still evokes a positive response from the device,
then and only then is he subject to search or frisk, but only if he voluntarily consents.
If such consent is denied, the individual shall forfeit his opportunity on that occasion
to be transported, and the air carrier shall deny his passage. S. Rep. No. 93-13, 93rd
Cong. 1st Sess. (1973).
46 People v. Erdman, 69 Misc. 2d 103, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ruiz-
Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
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willingness to proceed to the boarding area despite the presence of posters
warning of the search;48 however the implied consent theory has been uni-
formly unsuccessful as justification for search. In short, courts have been
reluctant to justify airport searches solely on the basis of consent, either
express or implied. Apparently this distrust of the consent search stems
either from a judicial respect for fourth amendment guarantees or from
the common sense presumption that a person does not "voluntarily" con-
sent to a search which he knows will reveal incriminating evidence.
Although no case was found to date in which consent alone was suffi-
cient to justify search, Schneckloth, as interpreted in Bleile, clearly suggests
that in future cases, the subject's uninformed submission will be sufficient
ground for lawful search even without the alternative justification offered
by the government in Bleile; i.e., the reasonable fear of hijacking based
on a high magnetometer reading. For example, a traveler in the airport
who neither met the "profile" nor activated the magnetometer could be
approached by a marshal and asked for his bag. The passenger unaware
of his right to refuse, may simply hand over his luggage thereby "con-
senting" to an unreasonable search and waiving his constitutional immu-
nity without being aware of its existence. In the context of this type
of search, the Schneckloth rule, that knowledge of alternatives is not a
prerequisite to consent, threatens to weaken the strict requirements for
consent which have been developed in airport search law.
To support his argument that he had not voluntarily consented to
search, the defendant in Bleile relied on the same line of cases that sup-
ported the defendant's arguments in Schneckloth. This line of cases from
the Ninth Circuit supports the doctrine that consent to search is not volun-
tary unless the prosecution can show that the subject knew of his right to
refuse consent.49  The Ninth Circuit premised its theory on a Supreme
Court ruling that consent to search is a waiver of a constitutional right and
that waiver in this context means an "intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege" '-" To this premise, the Ninth Circuit added:
(1) the waiver of a constitutional right must be a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment of that right; and (2) the consent must reflect an "under-
standing, uncoerced and unequivocal election to grant the officers a license
which the person knows may be freely and effectively withheld."'" By
insisting upon a knowing and intelligent consent, this line of cases diverged
48 United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); People v. Erdman, 69
Misc. 2d 103, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Signs posted by F.A.A. warned that it is
illegal to carry weapons on board aircraft and that passengers and baggage are subject to search.
40 Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390, 398-99 (9th Cir. 1968); Bustamonte v.
Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
5OJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
5
'1Cpres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826
(1966).
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from the majority view that the government need only show that the con-
sent was voluntary and free from coercion or duress, either physical or
psychological.52
Even though the requirement of such an informed consent is not a
majority view in general search and seizure law, this requirement was
recognized outside the Ninth Circuit particularly in the case law and litera-
ture involving airport searches. In United States v. Lopez,53 most often
cited on the issue of consent, the Second Circuit rejected the government's
contention that the defendant had consented to a search simply because he
had not resisted when asked by the marshals to accompany them to a pri-
vate area for search. "Such conduct," said the court, "by one who may
think himself in custody (although actual custodial detention was not es-
tablished) hardly amounts to an 'unequivocal specific, and intelligently
given consent.' 54 Although Lopez did not expressly require Miranda-
type warnings before search, the court cited a note in the text of the opin-
ion, in which the authors recommend detailed procedures analogous to
the Miranda warnings prior to consent searches. 55 The district court in
California cited Lopez when it issued the Meulener rule that prior to search
the subject must be advised of his right to avoid the search by not boarding.
Relying on the Meulener rule, Bleile argued that without the prescribed
advice, the search of his hand luggage could not be justified on the basis
of consent. The California court rejected this argument and stated that
the rule had been expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Schneck-
loth. The Court there indicated a preference for the California rule, point-
ing to the near impossibility of meeting the prosecutorial burden of affirm-
ative proof of knowledge demanded by the Ninth Circuit. To impose
upon the government the burden of proving the content of a person's sub-
jective understanding would raise doubt as to whether consent searches
could continue to be conducted.56 Further, although the Court itself rec-
ognized that Miranda-type warnings would go far in proving that the sub-
ject knew of his right, the Court refused to require such warnings, declar-
ing that it would be "thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal
consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning.157
Even assuming that detailed warnings are impracticable in the airport,
52 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); United States v. Fike, 449
F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1971).
53 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
54 Id. at 1093e
55 People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 98 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1971); Note, Consent
Searches: a Reappraisal after Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUTM. L REV. 130 (1967).
56 "Any defendant who was the subject of a search authorized solely by his consent could
effectively frustrate the introduction into evidence of the fruits of that search by simply failing
to testify that he in fact knew he could refuse to consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 230 (1973).
571d. at 231.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
it is submitted that the simple requirements of the Meulener rule plus a
statement warning the passenger that any evidence of illegal activity may
be used against him and reminding him also that his protection from
search is constitutionally based could be implemented without impairing
the efficiency of either the search or air travel. Since most passengers
arrive at boarding gates prior to boarding time, the warnings could be
given them during the waiting period before the search process begins.
The little time to be lost in administering the advice would be far out-
weighed by the assurances of meaningful con'sent to be gained through
the advice.
Another problem involving meaningful consent, raised in Schneckloth
but not in Bleile, is the question whether affirmative proof by the defen-
dant that he did not know of his right to refuse would nullify the consent.
The implication of Bleile is that it would not. This difficult question was
posed by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Schneckloth in which he sug-
gested that the majority was apparently deciding that even if the defendant
could convince the trier of fact that he did not know of his right to refuse,
the search would nevertheless be constitutional."s Bleile does nothing to
allay Mr. Justice Marshall's concern; indeed, it goes far toward vindicating
his rueful prediction that the holding in Schneckloth will confine the pro-
tection of the fourth amendment to the "sophisticated, the knowledgeable
and the few." At the moment of request for an otherwise unreasonable
search, the only shield the fourth amendment provides the citizen is the
right to refuse. If through lack of knowledge of the right, he is unable
to make effective use of that shield, his fourth amendment prptection is
meaningless. Surely, knowledge of the fourth amendment is not a pre-
requisite to the enjoyment of its protection. Unfortunately, the implica-
tion of Bleile is that the passenger must pay for his ignorance with a for-
feiture of his fourth amendment guarantees. And in this context, Bleile
points toward a stretching of the consent exception to include searches
which even after Schneckloth should be invalidated by the test of voluntary
consent.
IV. VOLUNTARY CONSENT AND COERCION IN THE AIRPORT
In contrast to the Bleile court's reading of Schneckloth is the Second
Circuit's refusal to accept Schneckloth as controlling in a* similar air search
case. In United States v. Ruiz-Estrella,59 conviction was based on the sei-
zure of a shotgun from the shopping bag of a would-be air line passenger
who had been identified as an F.A.A. "profile selectee" by an airline ticket
agent. A uniformed sky marshal was advised of the profile selection and
directed the subject into a stairwell at the end of the boarding ramp. After
581d. at 285.
59481 P.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
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closing the door behind them, the marshal either "asked" or "told" 0 the
subject to hand over the shopping bag for search. The defendant silently
complied, and a shotgun was found which was later admitted into evidence
in the trial and conviction of the defendant for firearms possession. On
appeal, the government attempted to justify the search on alternate theo-
ries: (1) the search was justified by the danger alone;"1 or (2) the pas-
senger had consented to the search. Neither of these theories was suc-
cessful. The first was rejected by the court on the ground that the search
was not reasonable, and the second on the theory that the defendant's "con-
sent" was ineffective because of the government's, failure to prove that
consent was voluntary. Interestingly, in support of its second theory the
government relied on the Schneckloth rule, as it had in Bleile; however,
the Second Circuit declined to interpret Schneckloth as the Bleile court had.
Noting that the Supreme Court had drawn a distinction in Schneckloth be-
tween the "congenial" atmosphere surrounding the search of the auto on
the highway and the coercive atmosphere of custody, Judge Smith stated:
The Supreme Court stressed that the environment in which the consent
took place was not inherently coercive, being a far cry from custodial
"interrogation in some remote station house." In contrast the dosed stair-
well of the airport comes much doser" to a traditional custodial situation.
... Further, the facts here do not amount to a showing that he, appellant,
was aware that he had the right to refuse to be searched if he should
choose not to board the aircraft .... The record makes it quite dear that
neither the ticket agent, the boarding agent nor the sky marshal made
Ruiz-Estrella aware of any such option.62
Clearly, the Second Circuit differs with the Bleile court in its reading
of Schneckloth on the question of what constitutes consent in the airport
search. The key difference seems to be the Second Circuit's appreciation
of the coercive nature of the search and the possibility that a passenger,
when singled out and confronted with a marshal's request for search, will
simply acquiesce if he is unaware of his right to refuse. For the Second
Circuit, such acquiescence is not consent and will not justify a search with-
out warrant or probable cause.63 Whereas the Bleile court read Schneck-
loth as freeing the prosecution from the necessity of proving knowledge of
the right to refuse consent as an essential part of its burden in establishing
consent, Ruiz-Estrella interpreted Schneckloth in terms of the one element
60 
"Whether we adopt the theory that appellant was told 'he would have to go through
a baggage search' (as LaSota, the marshal) stated on direct), or that he was 'asked to submit
to such a search' (as was testified on cross), is of little moment.... The fact that a suspect...
hands over his bag in such circumstances will hot support the inference of freely given consent."
Id. at 728.
61 The "danger alone" theory was rejected on the ground that the defendant, except for
meeting the profile, had done nothing that could be construed as dangerous nor had he
passed through or activated the magnetometer. Id. at 729.
62 
Id. at 728.
e8 Id.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
which the state must establish-freedom from coercion. On the question
of waiver of the fourth amendment rights by consent, the Second Circuit
has simply shifted the focus from the question of informed consent empha-
sized in fifth and sixth amendment cases to the traditional question of
uncoerced consent. Unlike Bleile, the Ruiz-Estrella decision anticipates
no quantitative alteration in the government's burden as a result of
Schneckloth, but merely a shift in emphasis.
Hopefully, in future airport search cases, thoughtful courts will, like
the Second Circuit direct attention to the compelling and coercive atmo-
sphere of the search.64  Indeed, the modern airport search bears little re-
semblance to the consent searches depicted in Schneckloth as normally
occurring on the highway, or in the subject's office or home, and under
"informal and unstructured conditions." '65 Air travel by its very nature
demands that the would-be passenger surrender effective control of his per-
son and belongings. From the time he enters the terminal, his actions
are directed by the voice of uniformed authority, which urges submission
to the established regimen as he is led through the preliminary steps
to flight. Given the passive state of the traveler and his conditioning to
follow any directive in the multi-staged process necessary to air travel, any
official request for search no matter how courteous, may be interpreted
as just another in a series of commands.
In order that the passenger might distinguish the request from an order,
a warning should accompany the request, advising the passenger that he
has a constitutional right not to be searched and further that any evidence
of illegal activity found during the search, whether or not related to hi-
jacking, can be admitted as evidence against him. Admittedly, the Supreme
Court in Schneckloth rejected such Miranda-type warnings as not prac-
ticable; however, the Schneckloth search as it was pictured by the Court
can be distinguished from the airport search on the basis of the inherently
compelling pressures of the airport and the possibility that the passenger
when approached by the marshal may believe himself in custody.6  Al-
though Schneckloth rejects knowledge as a prerequisite to consent, the
Court retains the requirement of freedom from coercion, and warnings
may well be the only way to assure meeting the latter requirement. Even
though warnings are not necessary to establish informed consent, a re-
minder of fourth amendment protections may be necessary to provide the
traveler with the constitutional "backbone" he needs to resist official coer-
cion in the airport.
64 Consider the Orwellian atmosphere achieved by planners of the Tampa International
Airport through the use of directions given by recorded voices from unseen sources.
65412 U.S. at 232.
66 The majority in Schneckloth expressly noted that "the present case does not require
a determination of what effect custodial conditions might have on a search authorized solely
by an alleged consent." Id. at 247 n. 36.
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V. CONCLUSION
Before Schneckloth, there was implict in much of the case law and
literature involving air search an underlying assumption that the waiver
of fourth amendment rights must meet the same strict standards of "know-
ing and intelligent" waiver currently required for effective relinquishment
of fifth and sixth amendment rights. Therefore, when courts were faced
with an attempt to justify a search on the basis of consent, a heavy burden
was usually placed upon the government to demonstrate not only that
the consent was uncoerced but also that it resulted from some kind of
meaningful choice. The implicit assumption that consent must be "know-
ing" to be valid became for the Ninth Circuit and the Meulener court an
express requirement. In Schneckloth, however, the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to extend the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard to fourth
amendment rights undercuts the assumption supporting that express re-
quirement, thus removing the element of knowledge from the prosecu-
torial burden of proving voluntary consent. The Bleile decision is one
unhappy but foreseeable consequence of Schneckloth. By requiring no
proof that the defendant knew of his right to refuse search while at the
same time ignoring the compelling and coercive atmosphere of the airport,
Bleile clearly points to a relaxation and lowering of the standards pre-
viously set by most courts for valid consent to airport searches. Fur-
ther, the dubious use of Schneckloth to negate the sensible requirements
of the Meulener rule, would eliminate this one well-articulated barrier to
further expansion of the Terry "reasonable fear" exception-the fear is
not reasonable and the search not justifiable if the passenger declines to
board the aircraft. The possible extension of Terry, implicit in Bleile,
to justify search of the non-boarding passengers, combined with the lower-
ing of standards for "consent" searches can only mean that for thousands
of Americans every day, the price of admission to the airport may be the
loss of much of their fourth amendment protection.
Fortunately, Bleile is only one case. And as the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Ruiz-Estrella indicates, there are persuasive arguments for refusing
to read Schneckloth as the Bleile court did. Instead of interpreting
Schneckloth as an absolute lowering of consent standards, the Second Cir-
cuit correctly shifted the focus from the question of informed consent to
a careful scrutiny of possible coercive factors in the airport. Finding that
official coercion can exist when ai individual is singled out for closer scru-
tiny, the Second Circuit rejected the government's argument that the de-
fendant had consented to the search, and without alternative justification
for search as there was in Bleile, the evidence was suppressed. The recog-
nition by thoughtful courts of compelling factors in the airport plus a
lingering distrust of uninformed waiver of constitutional protection should
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mitigate the threat to fourth amendment safeguards implicit in the Bleile
reading of Schneckloth.
However, if courts are indifferent to the coercive atmosphere of the
airport search, it remains arguable that searches conducted pursuant to
consent as it is defined by Schneckloth should still not be permitted in
the airport situation. The Supreme Court's definition of consent provides
at worst a trap for the constitutionally ignorant and at best a murky test
for "voluntariness" as unwieldy as the obscure test for reasonableness under
Terry. To the extent that abuse of consent, after Schneckloth, is possible,
the question is whether there is sufficient value in the consent search to
sustain its usT.
To support the governmental need for consent searches "the Supreme
Court stated that:
in stiuations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, a search
authorized by valid consent may be the only means of obtaining reliable
evidence .... And in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest
or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may still
be valuable. 67
This rationale will not support consent alone as a basis for anti-hijack
searches in the airport, since either of the situations described by the Court
-evidence of illicit activity or probable cause to arrest-would more than
meet the relaxed "reasonable fear" standards of Terry as it has been ap-
plied in air search law. The government would not need consent in those
situations. Moreover, since the F.A.A. anti-hijack screening system has
been held constitutionally permissible and the government has conceded
that no flight fully protected by the anti-hijacking system had been hi-
jacked,68 there appears to be little justification for the government's resort-
ing to consent as a basis for search, so long as hijack deterrence is truly the
purpose of the search. Since the government has been able to justify its
anti-hijack searches on other grounds and those searches have proved to be
effective when properly applied, there is no compelling governmental in-
terest sufficient to outweigh the possible invasion of the passenger's fourth
amendment rights through the use of the consent search. In short, if the
government has a legitimate reason for requesting consent, it does not need
consent; and if it has no legitimate reason for the search, the fourth amend-
ment was intended to stand squarely between the government and the citi-
zen. At the moment of request, given the threat of official coercion and
the possibility of the passenger's ignorance, his fourth amendment shield
may fall too easily.
The unconstitutionality of a search conducted solely on the basis of
67 Id. at 227.
68 United States v. Bell. 464 F.2d 667,676 (2d Cir. 1972),
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consent under these circumstances is foreshadowed by Justice Stewart's
words in the majority opinion of Schneckloth.:
[The] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not
be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.
For no matter how subtly the coercion were applied, the resulting "consent"
would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against
which the Fourth Amendment is directed." 69
Jeannie Y. Teteris
69412 U.S. at 228.
